Figuring prominently in their decisions regarding which theories to pursue are scientists' appeals to the promise or lack of promise of those theories. Yet philosophy of science has had little to say about how one is to assess theory promise. This essay identifies several indices that might be consulted to determine whether or not a theory is promising and worthy of pursuit. Various historical examples of appeals to such indices are introduced.

Drawing on diverse historical cases, this paper describes and examines various aspects of a modality of scientific appraisal which has remained largely unexplored, theory pursuit. Specifically, it addresses the following issues: the epistemic and pragmatic commitments involved in theory pursuit, including how these differ from those characteristic of theory acceptance; how the research interests of scientists enter into their pursuit decisions; some of the strategies for the refinement and extension of a theory's empirical abilities which typify theory pursuit; and the (...) need to distinguish between individual and community rationality in contexts of pursuit. (shrink)

Scientists typically do something other than accept or reject their theories, they pursue them. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century numerous chemists devoted their research energy and resources to the development of Daltonian theory, declaring themselves willing to make use of the atomic theory in their research but reluctant or unwilling to accept it. When Frankland, for example, declared that he did not want to be considered a “blind believer” in the atomic theory and could not “accept it (...) as true”, but that he had been—and planned to continue—using it “as a useful ladder”, he had arrived at a decision shared by many of his colleagues that while the theory was not acceptable, it was promising and worthy of pursuit.1 And when Van’t Hoff measured the kinetic-molecular theory by its fruits in the 1880’s, he judged that it barely gave the then-current 4% interest rate, and so was an unpromising theory, unworthy of pursuit (van Nelsen 1960. p. 151). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Belonging and genealogical bonds Beholdenness and reciprocal relations Respect, or the wish‐to‐be‐appreciated Knowledge, inherent value, and landkeeping.

Recent research in philosophy of science suggests that the relationship which scientists have towards the artifacts of science, i.e. their theories, is considerably richer than many traditional accounts of scientific appraisal would lead us to believe. Problem-solving methodologists, in particular, advocating a pragmatic account of scientific theories, argue that traditional methodologies have tended to focus exclusively on one modality of appraisal--that of theory acceptance, and have advanced normative proposals which provide only for assessments of the empirical well-foundedness of scientific theories. (...) As a result, it is held, these traditional accounts are unable to accommodate certain historical cases in which conceptual considerations have played a vital role in scientific appraisal, and in which the behavior of scientists clearly indicates something less or other than theory acceptance on their part. ;In this essay, a problem-solving methodology is adopted in the interests of contributing to this recent research in philosophy of science by critically assessing and further developing selected features of it. Two historical case-studies are presented. The first examines the theories of space and of motion advanced by Descartes and Newton, while the second explores atomism and affinitism in nineteenth-century chemical theory. These cases are used to establish: that conceptual considerations have figured significantly in the assessments which scientists make of their theories; that scientists do something more than accept or reject theories, they pursue them; and that in defending their decisions to pursue or not to pursue a theory, scientists typically do make reference to the promise, or lack of promise, of the theory. Specific normative proposals are developed which are intended to enrich our appreciation of scientific appraisal by providing an account of what it is to pursue a theory, of what it is for a theory to be promising, and of the role of conceptual considerations in supporting judgements of theory promise. (shrink)